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Abstract 
As is the case with marriage, divorce should be entered into freely and voluntarily. 
The State should not demand that a marriage be ended if neither one of the spouses 
wishes for it to be terminated. Yet, several countries still impose such an obligation in 
instances where one or both of the parties to the marriage changed their sex during 
the existence of the marriage, in order for such a person to attain legal recognition of 
the sex change. This article analyses some of the case law in Europe and South Africa 
where the courts have had to intercede in instances in which differential treatment 
was being justified in the name of so-called pragmatism. It examines some of the 
possible reasons for imposing this obligation upon married couples and the effect that 
this requirement has on their lives. Furthermore, it explores why it is incorrect to 
require the termination of marriage after a change of sex, how genderism and 
transphobia has caused differential and discriminatory treatment of transsexual 
persons, and how institutional bias and a lack of appreciation for the lived reality of 
people who do not necessarily fit into categories of generated systems, continue to 
negate the human rights of some humans. 
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1 ‘Computer Says No’ is the colloquial name given to “an attitude in customer service in which the 
default response is to check with information stored or generated electronically and then make 
decisions based on that, apparently without using common sense, and showing a level of unhelpfulness 
whereby more could be done to reach a mutually satisfactory outcome, but is not.” “Computer says 
no” Wikipedia, available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer_says_no (accessed on 28/06/2018). 
The name became a common phrase mainly through the use thereof in the popular British television 
sketch show, Little Britain. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers and the editor of this special 
edition of the journal for their valuable comments and suggestions. All errors that remain are due to 
my stubborn persistence.  
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International law protects the right to get married and establish a family. Thus, for 
example, it is stated in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) that “[m]en and women of marriageable age 
have the right to marry and to found a family”.3 Marriage should be entered into freely 
and voluntary, with the consent of both parties.4 It is also explained that the State 
should assist and protect the family unit.5 Therefore, it can be said that termination of 
marriage through divorce also should be entered into freely and voluntary, with the 
consent of (at least one of) the parties. Yet, as at May 2019, 32 states in Europe and 
Central Asia still break up marriages and families by imposing compulsory divorce 
upon married couples if one of the spouses has changed their sex (Trans Rights Europe 
& Central Asia, 2019).6 In these states, a person’s sex change will not be given official 
recognition in the instance where such a person has decided to remain committed to 
the spouse to whom they promised to remain married. Instead, this person will have 
to explain why their appearance does not resemble that of the picture presented in 
their official identity documentation and that they are not trying deceive anyone or 
commit fraud, purely because the person has remained true to their wedding vows. 
 
Fortunately, a number of states have recognised that this violation of human 
rights cannot be tolerated and have amended their national legal position 
accordingly.7 Admittedly, many of these legislative amendments only were effected 
as a result of a court instructing the State to do so, but in these jurisdictions a married 
couple is no longer forced to terminate their marriage in order to enable one spouse 
to exercise the right to legal gender recognition. This article will briefly describe some 
of the domestic case law in Europe that led to the legislative amendments. It will also 
reflect on a recent decision of 2018 in which the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) held that a UK citizen who had changed sex, cannot be required to annul the 
 
3 Art 12 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
1950. See also Art 16 of The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. 
4 See, for example Art 23(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, providing 
that “[n]o marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending spouses”. 
5 See Art 10 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966; Art 23 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966; and Art 18 of the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, 1981. 
6 For example, in Japan, s 3(1)(2) of the GID Act 2003 provides that trans persons “may not be married, 
insofar as [they intend] to obtain legal recognition” (Dunne, 2018). 
7 See, for example, New Zealand, Australia, Malta, Uruguay, Argentina, Mexico City, Scotland, England 
and Wales, and a number of other European states, as explained by (Open Society Foundations, 2014, 
pp. 7-8). 
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marriage entered into prior to the change, in order to receive sex-specific social 
security benefits to which that person is entitled. (MB v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions, 2018).8 
 
The article will then focus on how a South African court had to take a different 
course of action: in KOS and others v Minister of Home Affairs and others 2017,9 there was 
no legislation in force that required the dissolution of a marriage for full legal gender 
recognition to be provided by the State. The Court, instead, had to instruct a 
governmental department to adhere to, and execute its legislative duties, instructing 
them to provide full legal gender recognition to the applicants, as provided for in the 
Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act.10 The article seeks to reiterate why it 
is incorrect to require the termination of marriage post a change of sex. It will argue 
that genderism and transphobia are responsible for both legislation requiring divorce 
of a married couple subsequent to a sex change, as well as the institutional bias in 
governmental departments who fail to provide transgender people equal 
opportunities and a dignified life. This lack of appreciation for the lives of people who 
do not necessarily fit into categories of generated systems, continues to negate the 
human rights of some humans. 
 
2. Forced divorce case law in Europe 
The first reported decision of this nature hails from the St Gallen District Court in 
Switzerland in 1996, at a time when same-sex marriages had not yet been recognised 
as valid in this country. Following genital surgery, a married trans woman applied to 
be registered as a woman but wished to remain married (Graham-Siegenthaler, 1998). 
The Court held that this would result in the recognition of same-sex marriage, 
something which the Federal Court in 1993 found to be against public policy (Graham-
Siegenthaler, 1998). However, taking into account the interests of the applicant, her 
wife and that of the State, the Court held that such a marriage should be tolerated in 
this case. The Court recognised the importance of legal gender recognition and of 
protecting a functioning and existing marriage (Graham-Siegenthaler, 1998). As to the 
recognition of a marriage between persons of the same sex, the Court explained “that 
 
8 MB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 26 June 2018, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:492, available at:   
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=203337&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=l
st&dir=&occ=first&part=1&ci, last accessed 20 July 2020. 
9 KOS and others v Minister of Home Affairs and others 2017 (6) SA 588 (WCC), hereafter KOS v Minister of 
Home Affairs. 
10 49 of 2003, hereafter the Alteration Act. 
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with this solution, a situation was created that had de facto already existed” (Köhler 
and Ehrt, 2016, p.53).  
 
In 2006, an Austrian court11 acknowledged that Austria’s Civil Code, at that 
point, reserved the right to marry to opposite sex couples only but regarded it as 
“inexplicable” that only unmarried persons could amend their entry in the register of 
births, deaths and marriages, subsequent to a sex change (Open Society Foundations, 
2014, p. 8). In a matter decided in 2008 in Germany, the Constitutional Court found 
that section 8(1)(2) of the Law on the Amendment of Given Names and the 
Establishment of Gender in Special Cases (the Transsexual Act) of 10 September 1980 
was unconstitutional in that it required persons to be unmarried as a condition for 
legal gender recognition. (BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of 27 May 2008, 2008); 
(International Commission of Jurists, 2008); (Köhler and Ehrt, 2016). In this case, the 
German law forced a transgender woman, who at the time of the decision of the Court, 
had been married for 56 years, to divorce her wife. The Constitutional Court ruled that 
this provision of the Transsexual Act substantially limited the transgender person’s 
rights to human dignity, free development of personality, life and physical integrity, 
non-discrimination and equality before the law, as well as rights to marriage and the 
family as enshrined by articles 1(1), 2(1), 2(2), 3(3) and 6(1) of the Basic Law for the 
Federal Republic of Germany (International Commission of Jurists, 2008). Once again, 
the Court emphasised the importance of preserving the marriage of the petitioner and 
her wife, explaining that the divorce requirement contained in section 8(1)(2) of the 
Transsexual Act, drove their relationship into an ”existential crisis”, undermining its 
characteristic as “unchanged and irrevocably binding” (Köhler and Ehrt, 2016, p.55). 
 
In France, the Rennes Court of Appeal in October 2012,12 found that setting 
divorce as a requirement for official recognition of a change in sex was in breach of 
the right to private life, as enshrined by Article 8 of the ECHR (Köhler and Ehrt, 2016). 
The Court held that the validity of the marriage had to be determined at the time of 
its conclusion, and, since it originally involved a man and a woman, the marriage was 
valid  (Köhler and Ehrt, 2016; International Commission of Jurists, 2012).13 The Court 
 
11 Austrian Constitutional Court Case V 4/06-7 (decided on 8 June 2006). 
12 Case No. 11/08743, 1453, 12/00535. 
13 However, see also decisions in Swedish courts in 2015, Case no 3201-14, 9 July 2015, confirmed in 
Case no 6186-14, 5 October 2015, where it was held that a trans man who gave birth to a child 12 years 
ago, when he was still registered as a woman, has to be registered as the “father” of the child in public 
records. The defendant, being the Swedish Tax Agency, had designated the petitioner as “biological 
mother,” and refused to change its records. Relying on, inter alia, the presumption that the person who 
gave birth to a child was always presumed to be the mother, the Tax Agency refused to register the 
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also said that it was unnecessary to rectify the couple’s marriage certificate, since the 
trans spouse’s birth certificate already stated that she was married (Köhler and Ehrt, 
2016). In 2015, in Italy, the Supreme Court held14 that transgender marriages had to 
remain valid until Parliament introduced a legally recognized union that was 
substantially equivalent to marriage for persons of the same sex (Köhler and Ehrt, 
2016). The rules on the automatic dissolution of marriage in instances where one of 
the spouses changed their legal gender breached Article 2 of the Italian Constitution, 
which guaranteed “the inviolable rights of the person, both as an individual and in 
the social groups where human personality is expressed” (Köhler and Ehrt, 2016, 
p.56). The Italian Supreme Court found forced divorce as a consequence of legal 
gender recognition of one of the partners, to be unconstitutional as long as there is no 
equivalent institution to a marriage guaranteeing substantially the same rights to the 
spouses (Köhler and Ehrt, 2016). 
 
Following this line of reasoning, in the case of Hämäläinen v Finland,15 the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that a divorce requirement attached 
to legal gender recognition does not cause a violation of the ECHR in instances where 
the possibility exists of converting a marriage into a comparable institution, such as a 
registered partnershipCITATION Köh16 \l 1033  (Köhler and Ehrt, 2016) (Hämäläinen 
v. Finland, 2014). The applicant was a trans woman, who had married prior to her 
gender reassignment. A child was born to this couple from this marriage. Upon her 
application to have her status changed to female, the local registry office denied her 
request, based on legal provisions that required the spouses’ agreement to turn their 
marriage into a registered partnership, or terminate their marriageCITATION Köh16 
\l 1033  (Köhler and Ehrt, 2016). The applicant appealed, claiming that her wife was 
 
petitioner as the “father”. The Swedish courts held that to keep the petitioner registered as the 
“biological mother” contradicted the decision to fully recognise his gender as a man, and has the 
potential to breach his right to respect for private life in terms of Article 8 of the ECHR. Although the 
petitioner had given birth before changing his sex, the principle of full legal gender recognition, as well 
as the need to protect the privacy of the child, outweighed the public interest in assigning a ‘biological 
mother’ to each child (Köhler and Ehrt, 2016); (Sørlie, 2017). As a result, it can be said that in this case, 
the sex of the person at the point when the birth took place, became irrelevant, since full gender 
recognition needs to be given to the person. In the case of questioning the validity of a marriage, many 
courts have focussed on the sex of the persons at the point of time when the marriage was concluded. 
In contradistinction, an English High Court, in September 2019 (The Queen (on the application of TT) v 
Registrar General for England and Wales [2019] EWHC 2384), held that a man who gave birth to his son 
in 2018, could not be registered as the “father” on the child, since he was the person who gave birth to 
the child and such a person is regarded as the “mother” by the law. An analysis of these cases fall 
outside the scope of this article but definitely warrants further discussion. 
14 Cassazione Civile, sez. I, sentenza 21/04/2015 n° 8097. 
15 Hämäläinen v. Finland, judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 16 July 2014, case number 37359/09, 
available at https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-145768%22]} , last accessed 20 July 2020. 
Reviewed Article                                       International Journal of Gender, Sexuality and Law 
274 
 
perfectly entitled to withhold consent to convert their marriage into a registered 
partnership, since they both preferred to remain married. A divorce would be against 
their religious convictions, whilst a registered partnership did not provide the same 
security as marriage and would mean, among other things, that their child would be 
placed in a different situation from children born in wedlock (Hämäläinen v. Finland, 
2014). Both the Finnish courts, as well as the ECtHR16 rejected this claim, finding that 
that registered partnership offered the applicant and her family a similar level of 
protection to that afforded by marriage. Further, had her claim had been accepted, 
that would have led to the recognition of a de facto same-sex marriage (Köhler and 
Ehrt, 2016, p.57). The Court examined the particular arrangements that were in place 
in Finland and concluded that they were sufficiently protective of the couple’s 
interests. As a result, there was no violation of Article 8 of the ECHR. 
  
In a dissenting opinion, three judges found that the applicant lacked a real 
choice in this matter, emphasising the problematic practice of setting two human 
rights, namely the right to legal gender recognition and the right to marriage, against 
each other. To their mind, the majority did not sufficiently consider the role of the 
applicant’s and her wife’s religious convictions against divorce, nor did it reflect on 
the emotional hardship that the dissolution of this marriage would cause the couple 
(Hämäläinen v. Finland, 2014); (Open Society Foundations, 2014). The preservation of 
their marriage, which was a fait accompli, did not hurt public morals in any way, 
others’ rights and freedoms would be unaffected if the trans applicant and her wife 
remained married, and the institution of marriage would not be jeopardized 
(Hämäläinen v. Finland, 2014); (Open Society Foundations, 2014); (Köhler and Ehrt, 
2016).  
 
3. MB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions17 
 
3.1 The Gender Recognition Act 2004 of the United Kingdom 
 
 
16 At paras 84-85. 
17 MB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 26 June 2018, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:492, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=203337&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=l
st&dir=&occ=first&part=1&ci , last accessed 20 July 2020,hereafter the MB decision. 
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Since 2004, the United Kingdom’s (UK) Gender Recognition Act (GRA) has enabled 
transgender persons over the age of 18 to apply for a Gender Recognition Certificate 
if such a person had been living in the other gender or changed gender in the UK or 
under the law of a country or territory outside the UK.18 In terms of sections 2 and 3 
of the GRA, a person must: have or must have had gender dysphoria; have lived in 
the acquired gender throughout the period of two years ending with the date on 
which the application is made; intend to continue to live in the acquired gender until 
death, and submit several supporting documentation from medical practitioners. 
Section 3 further requires, inter alia, from the applicant a statutory declaration as to 
whether or not the applicant is married.19 Prior to amendments in 2014, the GRA 
provided that, should a successful applicant have been unmarried, he or she would 
have been issued a full gender recognition certificate, entitling such a person to 
assume “the acquired gender” for all purposes.20 However, should an applicant have 
been married, an interim gender recognition certificate would have been issued.21 A 
full gender certificate would have only been issued upon the annulment of the 
marriage of the applicant.22 
 
3.2 The facts 
 
MB, assigned male at birth in 1948, married her wife in 1974. She began to live her life 
as a woman in 1991 and in 1995 underwent sex reassignment surgery.23 MB and her 
wife wish to remain married and for this reason, she never was able to receive a full 
certificate of her change of gender. As a result, even though her physical, social and 
 
18 S 1 of the GRA. For the purposes of this article, the version that was applicable to the facts of the MB 
case, will be discussed. The GRA does not provide for a new birth certificate to be issued to such a 
person, as is the case in terms of the South African Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act. 
The GRA has been amended on a number of occasions.  
19 S 3(6)(a). In 2005 the provision was amended to also require a declaration if the person was a partner 
in terms of the Civil Partnership Act 2004. 
20 S 4(2) read with s 9(1). The “acquired gender” is explained as “so that, if the acquired gender is the 
male gender, the person’s sex becomes that of a man and, if it is the female gender, the person’s sex 
becomes that of a woman”. 
21 S 4(3). S 4 has been amended by the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 and it now provides that 
a full gender recognition certificate may be issued to a married applicant if their spouse consents. See 
also (Hamilton, 2019). 
22 In terms of Schedule 2 of the GRA. The court that granted the decree of nullity, also had to issue the 
full gender recognition certificate in terms of s 5 of the GRA. 
23 The term used by the CJEU at para 16 of the judgment. 
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psychological features met the requirements of the GRA, she was still considered a 
man, merely because she did not want to have her marriage annulled.24 
 
In 2008, MB turned 60. In terms of UK legislation applicable at the time,25 a 
woman born before 6 April 1950 became eligible for the State retirement pension at 
the age of 60. A man born before 6 December 1953 became eligible at the age of 65. 
MB’s application for such a pension was denied on 2 September 2008, based on the 
fact that, in the absence of a full gender recognition certificate, she could not be treated 
as a woman for the purposes of determining her statutory pensionable age.26 MB’s 
appeals against this decision were also dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal, the Upper 
Tribunal and the Court of Appeal.27  
 
Upon MB’s appeal to the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in 2016, the 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions submitted that, in terms of European case 
law28 and the ECHR, States are required to recognise the acquired gender of 
transsexual persons, but not required to allow marriages between same-sex couples. 
It was argued that maintaining the traditional concept of marriage as being a union 
between a man and a woman could justify making recognition of a change of gender 
subject to such a condition.29 The Supreme Court was divided on the matter and 
decided to stay the proceedings at national level, referring the matter to the CJEU for 
a preliminary ruling. As a result, the CJEU was tasked with answering this question: 
“‘Does Council Directive 79/7/EEC preclude the imposition in national law of a 
requirement that, in addition to satisfying the physical, social and psychological 
criteria for recognising a change of gender, a person who has changed gender 
must also be unmarried in order to qualify for a State retirement pension?”30 
 
24 In terms of s 11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, in its version applicable to the case, a valid 
marriage could legally exist only between a male and a female. The Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 
2013 only came into force on 10 December 2014. 
25 Section 44, read with section 122 of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992, and read 
with Schedule 4, paragraph 1, of the Pensions Act 1995. 
26 Paras 16 to 19 of the judgment. 
27 Para 20. 
28 It was submitted that in the case of Hämäläinen v Finland, CE:ECHR:2014:0716JUD003735909 (ECtHR, 
16 July 2014) the European Court of Human Rights recognised that Member States may make 
recognition of a change of gender conditional on the annulment of that person’s marriage. See para 24 
of the MB decision. 
29 Para 24. 
30 Para 25. 




3.3 The judgment 
 
The CJEU made it clear that the question that it had to answer, concerned “only the 
conditions for entitlement to the State retirement pension” and not whether the legal 
recognition of gender change may be conditional on the annulment of a marriage 
entered into before that change of gender.31 In this respect, the CJEU conceded that EU 
law does not detract from the competence of Member States in matters of civil status 
and legal recognition of the change of a person’s gender. However, Member States 
still have to comply with EU law when exercising that competence, and, in particular, 
with the provisions relating to the principle of non-discrimination.32 Article 4 of 
Council Directive 79/7/EEC provides that “there shall be no discrimination 
whatsoever on ground of sex either directly, or indirectly by reference in particular to 
marital or family status”.33 This means that one person cannot be “treated less 
favourably on grounds of sex than another person is, has been or would be treated in 
a comparable situation”.34  
 
The Court found that in this case, access to pension funds were made 
dependent on the annulment of marriage: due to the provisions of the GRA, access to 
a State retirement pension by persons who have changed gender depended on the 
annulment of the marriage into which they may have entered before that change. By 
contrast, that marriage annulment condition did not apply to persons who have 
retained their birth gender and are married.35 The purpose of the marriage annulment 
condition36 was unrelated to the pension scheme.37 As a result, the Grand Chamber of 
the CJEU came to the conclusion that the national legislation provided less favourable 
treatment to persons who changed gender after marrying, than to persons who did 
not change gender and remain married, even though such persons are in comparable 
 
31 Para 27. 
32 Para 29. 
33 Council Directive of 19 December 1978: On the progressive implementation of the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women in matters of social security (79/7/EEC), available at https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/1979/7/oj (last accessed on 6/12/2018). 
34 The Court referring at para 34 to the definition of “direct discrimination” as found in Article 2(1)(a) 
of Directive 2006/54/EC of The European Parliament and of The Council of 5 July 2006 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in 
matters of employment and occupation (recast). 
35 Para 36. 
36 Namely to avoid marriage between persons of the same sex. 
37 Para 46. 
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situations.38 The Court held that this discrimination based on sex was prohibited by 
Directive 79/7.39 
 
4. KOS v Minister of Home Affairs 
 
4.1 The Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act 
 
In September 2017, the Western Cape Division of the South African High Court 
delivered a judgment in which it essentially directed the Department of Home Affairs 
to adhere to and execute its legislative duties. In order to understand the facts of this 
decision, the provisions of and the clear facilitation of the implementation of rights in 
terms of the Alteration Act, must first be understood. It must also be emphasised that 
the provisions of this act came into operation in March 2004. In terms of section 2(1), 
a “person whose sexual characteristics have been altered by surgical or medical 
treatment or by evolvement through natural development resulting in gender 
reassignment, or any person who is intersexed may apply to the Director-General of 
the National Department of Home Affairs for the alteration of the sex description on 
his or her birth register”. This means that the person will be able to change the 
descriptor originally affixed to his or her birth certificate to the one which more 
accurately describes the sex with which the person identifies. Such an application 
must be accompanied by certain documentation, which may include reports by 
medical practitioners and psychologists or social workers.40 The Alteration Act also 
clearly provides that the consequences of a successful application for the alteration of 
someone’s sex description are that, from the date of the recording of the alteration, 
such a person will be deemed for all purposes to be a person of the “new” sex 
description.41 Of particular importance for the purposes of the topic in the KOS matter, 
is section 3(3), which stipulates that any rights and obligations that have been acquired 
by or accrued to such a person before the alteration of his or her sex description, are 
 
38 Para 48. 
39 Para 52. 
40 S 2(2) of the Alteration Act. Should the application be refused, in terms of s 2(3) – (5) of the Act, the 
Director-General must furnish reasons for the decision and the applicant may appeal to the Minister of 
Home Affairs for assistance. Should the appeal be refused, the applicant may, in terms of s 2(6) – (10), 
turn to the magistrate of the district in which he or she resides for an order directing the change of his 
or her sex description. 
41 S 3(2). 
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not adversely affected by the alteration. The Act clearly does not apply with 
retrospective effect. 
 
4.2 The facts42 
 
The first, third and fifth applicants in the matter were all persons who sought to alter 
their sex description in terms of the Alteration Act. Their respective spouses were the 
second, fourth and sixth applicants.43 The first, third and fifth applicants married their 
spouses prior to surgical and/or medical treatment that altered their sexual 
characteristics. The first applicant, KOS, was born in 1981 and raised as a male but 
stated that she “always knew that [she] was different”.44 She married the second 
applicant in 2011, a year before she was diagnosed with gender dysphoria. She had 
been on hormone therapy since 2013, in preparation to her gender reassignment 
surgery. In March 2014, exactly ten years after the coming into operation of the 
Alteration Act, KOS, accompanied by her wife, went to the Department of Home 
Affairs’ offices in George. Here she submitted her application in terms of the 
Alteration Act to have her sex description on her birth certificate changed. The first 
official whom they approached at the offices, told them that it was impossible to alter 
her gender45 and that it “must be an offence of some kind”.46 Not even upon being 
presented with a copy of the Alteration Act, which KOS and her wife took with them, 
could the official be persuaded to accept her application. Eventually the couple 
managed to find an official who accepted her application, where after it disappeared 
 
42 Although the facts of this case are very similar to the set of circumstances that are of application in 
the other matters, discussed above, it is important to provide considerable detail of the treatment and 
responses which the applicants in the KOS matter were exposed to, in order to illustrate the argument 
that despite legislative instructions, governmental officials still have the power to impose their own 
bias and prejudice. 
43 Gender Dynamix, a registered non-profit organisation seeking the promotion, advancement, and 
defence of the rights of transgender and “gender non-conforming” persons in South Africa, joined the 
matter as the seventh applicant. See para 26 of the judgment. 
44 Para 33. 
45 The term used at para 34 of the judgment, despite the acknowledgement by the Court in fn 22 (of para 
20) that the terms “sex” and “gender” is often (incorrectly) used interchangeably. The Court referred to 
the correct descriptors provided by Albertyn and Goldblatt, “Equality” in Woolman and Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nd ed, at 35-55, at para 20 (fn 22) of the judgment, explaining that “’sex’ 
is generally taken to mean the biological differences between men and women, while ‘gender’ is the 
term used to describe the socially and culturally constructed differences between men and women.” 
46 Para 34. 
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into the deep and mysterious vaults of the Department of Home Affairs. Several e-
mails and phone calls as to the progress of her application produced no results.47  
 
During the prolonged period that KOS’s application “was mired in 
bureaucratic inertia”,48 her physical features also took on the form of a woman due to 
the hormonal treatment that she was receiving. As a result, KOS often found herself 
in embarrassing situations in which she had to explain why her appearance did not 
resemble that of the picture presented in her official identity cards. In some instances, 
people understood her predicament, but in other instances she was met with hostility 
and suspicion. This caused KOS to withdraw from participation from public life and 
she left the management of her affairs to her wife.49  
 
In April 2015, when KOS approached the regional departmental headquarters 
in Cape Town, she was eventually told that the Head Office in Pretoria had no record 
of her application. Thankfully, KOS received some co-operation from the officials 
working in the Cape Town office, and a copy of her application was faxed to Pretoria 
on two occasions. In June 2015, the Head Office advised that they needed more 
information in the form of expert reports; in particular, a letter from a medical doctor 
stating that “the operation was done”,50 even though reassignment surgery is not a 
requirement for relief in terms of the Alteration Act. Four months later, KOS was told 
that it had been ascertained that she was married and that the application could not 
be processed without proof that she had obtained a divorce. The reason given was 
that two women could not be married to each other. Upon challenging this 
statement,51 the couple was told that the problem related to the Department’s 
computer system,52 which would not allow KOS’s identity number to be changed 
while she remained registered as having been married under the Marriage Act.53 It 
 
47 Paras 35 – 36. 
48 Para 36. 
49 Para 36. 
50 Binns-Ward J quoting the words contained in the letter at para 39 of the judgment. 
51 Since 2006, persons of the same sex are able to conclude a marriage or civil partnership in terms of 
the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 (hereafter the Civil Union Act). 
52 See paras 40, 46 and 50 of the decision. 
53 25 of 1961, hereafter the Marriage Act. The common law definition of marriage, being “a union of one 
man with one woman, to the exclusion, while it lasts, of all others”, read with s 30 of the Marriage Act, 
excludes same-sex couples from the ambit of the Marriage Act. 
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was then suggested that she and the second applicant should go through with divorce 
proceedings and then remarry in terms of the Civil Union Act.54  
 
At this point it must be explained that in South Africa, a person’s ID number is 
made up of (a) his or her date of birth, (b) gender; and (c) South African citizenship 
status (as well as a serial, index and control number). It does not reflect the person’s 
marital status. However, a person will have to be assigned a new ID number when he 
or she has altered their sex description. 
 
The third and fifth applicants had similar experiences to that of KOS.55 GNC 
underwent reassignment surgery and succeeded in changing her forenames and 
obtaining an identity document that reflects her appearance as a female, but bizarrely 
her ID continued to indicate her sex as male. When she applied for an altered birth 
certificate, she was informed, in July 2016, by the same official who originally first 
dealt with KOS’s application, that the Department’s computer system “simply 
[would] not allow an amendment to [her] gender as [she] was married in terms of the 
Marriage Act”.56 GNC was also advised to obtain a divorce and to remarry under the 
terms of the Civil Union Act. GNC explained in her affidavit that she saw “no need to 
get a divorce to satisfy a computer system”.57 It was argued that to apply for an order 
for divorce, claiming that irretrievable breakdown of their marriage had taken place,58 
would amount to perjury. In the circumstances, GNC’s application to have her sex 
description changed, had effectively been refused.  
 
54 In terms of this piece of legislation, two persons, including persons of the same sex, but above the age 
of 18 may enter into a “voluntary union” and register it “by way of either a marriage or a civil 
partnership”. In terms of s 13 of this act, “the legal consequences of a marriage contemplated in the 
Marriage Act apply, with such changes as may be required by the context, to a civil union”. Therefore, 
in theory, couples who are of the same sex, are entitled to exactly the same rights and consequences as 
that which couples of the opposite sex have, except that same sex couples have to get married in terms 
of a different piece of legislation. The formalities for entering into a valid civil union and marriage, 
prescribed in terms of the Civil Union Act, are exactly the same as those prescribed by the Marriage 
Act, except for the fact that spouses have to be over the age of 18 in terms of the Civil Union Act. In 
terms of the Marriage Act, girl children as young as 12 may get married, provided that the necessary 
consent had been obtained from the relevant authorities. 
55 GNC married her wife in 1988 and a daughter was born to them in 1992. She disclosed her situation 
to her wife only in 2014. The fourth applicant was always understanding of GNC’s situation and 
supported her decision to transition. 
56 Para 46. It would appear as if the Department of Home Affairs, in this instance, was guilty of the 
practice of “dead-naming” GNC, i.e. using the old name or pronoun of a transgender individual 
intentionally. (Henzel, 2016). 
57 Para 46. 
58 As required by s 4 of the Divorce Act, 70 of 1979. 




In the case of the fifth applicant, WJV, an official at the Roodepoort offices of 
the Department of Home Affairs advised her that it would be better to use a two-stage 
process: first she had to have her names changed; hereafter she could apply to have 
her sex description altered. The official advised that trying to achieve both objectives 
together would “confuse the system” and be likely to cause “a slowing and/or stalling 
of the application”.59 She took this advice but, alas, the system was still confused and 
slow. Eventually in October 2015, WJV was invited to come to the Department’s office 
in Roodepoort as her documents were ready. Upon her arrival at the office, WJV was 
handed a letter confirming that her gender had been changed. Her wife, however, was 
informed that she was required to obtain a replacement identity card. It was explained 
to them that as a consequence of the registration of WJV’s sex/gender change, the 
Department had had to delete its record of their marriage — so the Department’s 
system now reflected that they had never married — and that the sixth applicant’s 
surname had therefore reverted to her maiden name. They were advised that they 
were free to marry under the terms of the Civil Union Act, and told that the 
Department would be willing to facilitate the solemnisation of a marriage between 
them in terms of this Act. It must be emphasised that in this instance the Department 
of Home Affairs took a different approach by granting the application in terms of the 
Alteration Act but also took it upon themselves, without cause or legal basis, to 
‘merely’ delete the couple’s marriage from their records. 
 
4.3 The judgment 
 
Binns-Ward J found that there is “nothing in the Alteration Act itself that expressly or 
impliedly indicates that an applicant’s marital status has any bearing on the ability or 
entitlement of a person who has transitioned to obtain administrative relief”.60 In fact, 
the Minister, Director-General and Deputy Director-General of Home Affairs also 
conceded to this fact.61 The judge confirmed that the purpose of the Alteration Act is 
to facilitate the maintenance of an accurate and meaningfully informative population 
register. Since it is an offence, in terms of the Identification Act,62 to fail to obtain a 
replacement identity card if the current card does not reflect the correct particulars, 
and since this cannot be done if the population register does not reflect the correct 
 
59 Para 50. 
60 Para 73. 
61 Para 72. 
62 68 of 1997, hereafter the Identification Act. 
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details, it is imperative that the Alteration Act assists in providing the correct 
information.63  
 
The respondents’ main objection to the implementation of the Alteration Act in 
the circumstances of the applicants, was that it was impossible to reconcile the 
changed sex of people who wanted to remain married in terms of the Marriage Act. 
They contended that the Marriage Act does not allow for and apply to a marriage that 
“was concluded as heterosexual and subsequently became same-sex”. As a result, and 
since there is a “parallel regime of the law governing marriage”, the applicants should 
have been married in terms of the Civil Union Act.64 To this argument, Binns-Ward J 
responded that, in South Africa, there is “no parallel system of civil marriage, … ; there 
is only a parallel system for the solemnisation of marriages.”65 When people are 
married in terms of the Marriage Act, they make exactly the same promise as people 
who are married in terms of the Civil Union Act.66 The consequences of marriages 
concluded in terms of the Marriage Act are also exactly the same as for those marriages 
concluded in terms of the Civil Union Act, even though such consequences are 
determined (predominantly) by the common law and not by the Marriage Act or Civil 
Union Act. Furthermore, the Marriage Act “does not contain anything prohibiting a 
party to a marriage duly solemnised in terms of the formula prescribed in s 30(1) from 
undergoing a sex-change or obtaining an altered birth certificate in terms of the 
Alteration Act”.67 As a result, the marriages of the applicants remained valid, despite 
the alteration of one of the spouse’s sex, and could only have been terminated through 
death or divorce.  
 
 
63 From a practical perspective, the Court explained how important identification documents are in 
daily life. It is incredibly frustrating, embarrassing and sometimes also degrading or even dangerous 
for someone whose sex characteristics have been altered to be forced to keep a card showing their 
original sex with a photograph depicting them as a person of the opposite sex to that which they 
actually appear to be. See paras 36, 47, 55, 74 and 75. 
64 Para 63. 
65 Para 85. 
66 The wording of the formula found in s 30(1) of the Marriage Act is the same as that of s 11 of the Civil 
Union Act, except that gender-neutral terms are used. 
67 Para 82. The Court continued, expressing it doubts as to the constitutional validity of such a possible 
provision: “Any provision that had such an effect would … probably be found to offend against the 
basic rights of everyone to equality because it would be likely to unfairly discriminate against affected 
parties on one or more of the grounds set out in s 9(3) of the Bill of Rights and also to unjustifiably 
infringe the right that everyone has to bodily and psychological integrity, including the right to security 
in and control over their body (s 12(2)(b) of the Bill of Rights).” 
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The Court also ruled that, even though a computer system found it difficult to 
cope with the set of facts which presented itself, the problem could easily be solved. 
In terms of s 38(1)(a) of the Marriage Act, the Minister of Home Affairs could use her 
regulatory powers to “make provision for an appropriate form to cater for any 
required amendments to the official records or registers”.68 The Court found that the 
Minister could not rely on “any shortcomings in the regulatory record-keeping 
mechanisms of the Marriage Act” and in doing so, deny transgendered persons their 
substantive rights under the Alteration Act.69  
 
4.4 Effecting the judgment 
 
Apart from creating their own rules or merely blankly ignoring and refusing to 
comply with their legislative duties,70 the Department of Home Affairs is also known 
to ignore court orders.71 It is reported that by March 2019, the Department had not yet 
complied with the order by Binns-Ward J in KOS (Sloth-Nielsen, 2019). Another 
judgment by the Gauteng Division of the High Court in a matter which also relates to 
the rights of a person who changed her sex but was still married at the time of her 
application, serves as another example where the Department failed to implement 
clear instructions in a court order. In the decision of GPCM v Minister of Home Affairs 
and others,72 the Court ordered the Director-General of Home Affairs to, within three 
weeks of the date of the order (13 July 2017), alter the Applicant's sex 
description/marker on the birth certificate/register and identity document, reflecting 
her sex description/marker as female. By May 2019, the Department had not yet given 
 
68 At para 84. 
69 Para 84. 
70 In the most recent example, a number of women reported that officials at various offices of the 
Department of Home Affairs refuse to adhere to married women’s specific requests to retain their 
maiden names on identification documents and despite s 26 of the Births and Deaths Registration Act 
51 of 1992 providing this option. In these instances, it is not evident whether or not officials blamed a 
patriarchal computer system for the lack of compliance but it has been explained that a husband’s 
consent, and in some instances even the woman’s father’s and stepfather’s written permission, was 
required to enable the officials to perform their duties (Wild, 2019); (Vos, 2019); (Grobler, 2019). This, 
despite the Department issuing a circular in 2016 stating that “the Department had issued an instruction 
to officials to allow women to indicate their choice of surname under which they wish to be recorded 
in the National Population Register following the registration of a marriage” (Department of Home 
Affairs, 2019). See further examples of lack of compliance with legislative instructions in Ruyobeza and 
Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2003 (5) SA 51 (C); J v Director-General, Department of Home 
Affairs 2003 (5) SA 605 (D)Minister of Home Affairs v Scalabrini Centre 2013 (6) SA 421 (SCA).  
71 As Minister of Home Affairs v Somali Association of South Africa 2015 (3) SA 545 (SCA) also illustrates. 
72 GPCM v Minister of Home Affairs and others, case number 38909/2017, decision of 16 May 2019 by the 
North-Gauteng division of the High Court, Pretoria, as yet unreported. 
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5.1 Genderism, transphobia and discrimination 
 
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “transphobia” as an “irrational fear of, 
aversion to, or discrimination against transgender people” (Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary, 2019). Hill and Willoughby distinguish between “genderism”, 
“transphobia” and “gender-bashing”.74 Genderism is described as: 
“an ideology that reinforces the negative evaluation of gender non-conformity 
or an incongruence between sex and gender. It is a cultural belief that 
perpetuates negative judgments of people who do not present as a stereotypical 
man or woman. Those who are genderist believe that people who do not conform 
to sociocultural expectations of gender are pathological. Similar to heterosexism, 
we propose that genderism is both a source of social oppression and 
psychological shame, such that it can be imposed on a person, but also that a 
person may internalize these beliefs.” (Hill and Willoughby, 2005, p.534).  
These internalised beliefs and psychological shame may often lead to reluctance to 
disclose a trans identity, especially within a marriage. However, it is of course also 
true that a hidden trans identity and non-disclosure of the reality, may also “reduce 
the potential for future relationship stability” (Dunne, 2018, p. 219).  
 
“Transphobia” in turn is the: 
“emotional disgust toward individuals who do not conform to society’s gender 
expectations. Similar to homophobia, the fear or aversion to homosexuals … 
transphobia involves the feeling of revulsion to masculine women, feminine 
men, cross-dressers, transgenderists, and/or transsexuals. Specifically, 
transphobia manifests itself in the fear that personal acquaintances may be trans 
or disgust upon encountering a trans person. … The “phobia” suffix is used to 
 
73 See para 3 of the Court’s judgment. 
74 Gender-bashing is a fear which manifests itself in “the assault and/or harassment of persons who do 
not conform to gender norms” (Hill and Willoughby, 2005, p. 534). 
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imply an irrational fear or hatred, one that is at least partly perpetuated by 
cultural ideology.” (Hill and Willoughby, 2005, pp533-534).  
 
It is submitted that the applicants in the South African case of KOS v Minister of 
Home Affairs experienced genderism and transphobia at the hands of some of the 
officials at the Department of Home Affairs who presented this ideology and disgust, 
especially the official who told KOS that changing one’s sex “must be an offence of 
some kind”.75 The treatment that the applicants had to endure from this governmental 
department amounts to social oppression and it caused them much psychological 
shame.  
 
However, it is further submitted that requiring a person who has changed sex to 
terminate their marriage, as well as requiring a conversion of a marriage into “a 
comparable institution”76 amounts to both genderism and homophobia, and 
ultimately unjustifiable discrimination. In the words of Sharpe, “[t]hese are not 
normative ideas that law should support” (Sharpe, 2012, p. 39). In fact, it is submitted 
that it is the task of the law to eradicate such ideas by implementing regulatory 
mechanisms which support and promote the rights of those who do not conform to 
the sociocultural expectations. 
 
While the CJEU found that the UK legislation discriminated against MB, the 
Court was not competent to answer the question as to whether “the legal recognition 
of gender change may be conditional on the annulment of a marriage entered into 
before that change of gender”.77 Although the underlying cause of MB’s problems 
remained unaddressed, the MB case is to be welcomed because it succeeded in 
alleviating at least some of the detrimental effects of the divorce requirement. While 
it admittedly falls outside the jurisdiction of the CJEU, it is rather disappointing, to 
say the least, that the argument could be submitted in the Supreme Court of the UK 
in 2016 that States are required to recognise the acquired gender of transsexual 
persons, but not required to allow marriages between same-sex couples. In 
demarcating marriage as an institution that is exclusively available to persons of the 
 
75 See para 34 of the judgment, and 4. 
76 As was required and endorsed by the ECtHR in the Finish case of Hämäläinen v Finland, see 15 above. 
77 Para 27 of the MB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions decision, and 3 3 above. See also (Sloth-
Nielsen, 2019) explaining at 8 that in Hämäläinen v Finland “[t]he starting point for the European Court 
was to reiterate that the ECHR did not impose an obligation on the member states to allow same-sex 
marriage”. 
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opposite sex, the law is perpetuating the differential and discriminatory treatment of 
transsexual and homosexual persons. When requiring the termination of marriage 
post a change of sex, a state is not only infringing upon the human rights of a group 
of vulnerable persons but also acting contrary to a number of legal principles.  
 
5.2 Forced divorce and the law 
 
Although not binding in terms of international law, the third principle of the 
Yogyakarta Principles78 clearly states that “[n]o status, such as marriage or 
parenthood, may be invoked as such to prevent the legal recognition of a person’s 
gender identity.” The World Professional Association for Transgender Health 
(WPATH) similarly states “that marital and parental status should not be barriers to 
recognition of gender change” (The World Professional Association for Transgender 
Health, 2017). In Europe, both the current and former Council of Europe 
Commissioner for Human Rights have criticised gender recognition provisions that 
force trans people to divorce their spouses. In 2009, Thomas Hammarberg 
recommended that member states “remove any restrictions on the right of trans 
persons to remain in an existing marriage following a recognised change of gender” 
(Open Society Foundations, 2014, p. 7). In addition, Commissioner Hammarberg’s 
2011 report recommended that member states “respect the right of transgender 
persons to effectively exercise their right to marry in accordance with their legally 
recognised gender” (Open Society Foundations, 2014, p. 7) and that to protect “all 
individuals without exception from state-forced divorce has to be considered of 
higher importance than the very few instances in which this leads to same-sex 
marriages” (Open Society Foundations, 2014, p. 9). In November 2012, Commissioner 
Nils Muižnieks added his voice to this call when he wrote to the Irish Minister of Social 
Protection, urging that “divorce should not be a necessary condition for gender 
recognition as it can have a disproportionate effect on the right to family life” (Open 
Society Foundations, 2014, p. 7).79  
 
To force a couple who are still devoted to each other to terminate their marriage 
violates their rights to equality and non-discrimination, privacy, dignity, freedom of 
 
78 Principles on the application of international human rights law in relation to sexual orientation and 
gender identity.  
79 See also (Dunne, 2018) at 234-247, arguing that forced divorce causes “an unnecessary and improperly 
balanced disruption to family life” (at 216). 
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association, the right to family life and the best interests of their children.80 The effect 
that this additional requirement may have on a family who has already had to endure 
a substantial amount of change, is enormous and the emotional costs should not be 
underestimated. Rather than dissolving such a marriage, this marriage that “has 
stayed strong through one partner’s transition should be celebrated” (Open Society 
Foundations, 2014, p. 3).81 In addition, as stated above at the introduction of this article, 
the State has a duty to protect family life and cannot force spouses to enter into a 
divorce against their will. Further, to my mind it was correctly argued in KOS v 
Minister of Home Affairs, that to force spouses in countries such as South Africa to 
submit to court that their marriage had broken down irretrievably,82 would oblige 
such persons to lie under oath.83 
 
Another aspect that cannot be ignored, is the practical consequences of 
compelling couples to divorce but then to enter into another type of relationship that 
is recognised by the State as a valid form of “same-sex union”. Apart from the actual 
costs of a divorce (and the de facto perjury mentioned above), questions as to the 
matrimonial consequences of the forced divorce, and re-entry into another form of 
marriage will have to be answered. In South-Africa, for example, one can only imagine 
the logistical nightmare that were to ensue in the instance where a couple is married 
out of community of property but with the accrual system being applicable to their 
marital property regime.84 Tax benefits may be terminated, only to be resumed again. 
Further, beyond the financial implications, the impact of divorce can be disrupting, 
“particularly when a spouse’s immigration visa is based on marital status” (Open 
Society Foundations, 2014, p. 3). 
 
The main justification for requiring a couple to divorce in these circumstances, 
is that a sex change effectively converts a heterosexual marriage into a same-sex 
 
80 See, in particular, (Dunne, 2018, p. 220) citing a number of studies that found that “children suffer 
where trans couples engage in domestic life”. 
81 (Dunne, 2018, p. 217) refers to Bischof et al 2011, who observe the “subtle homophobia that underlies 
[the] assumption that families or marriages cannot survive gender transition.” 
82 As required by s 4 of the South African Divorce Act. This general and most frequently used ground 
for divorce, irretrievable breakdown, requires proof of the breakdown of a normal marital relationship, 
to such an extent that it cannot be restored. The other two grounds for divorce, namely continuous 
unconsciousness and mental illness, require medical proof and are used less often. 
83 See 4.2 above. 
84 A forced divorce followed by a re-marriage, will cause, for example, the calculation and division of 
the accrual, only for the transferred amounts to now be used as artificial commencement values for the 
“new” marriage, potentially prejudicing spouses’ financial positions and rights. For an explanation of 
this “deferred community of property system”, see ss 3 to 6 of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984. 
Reviewed Article                                       International Journal of Gender, Sexuality and Law 
289 
 
marriage. In an ideal world, marriage equality laws should recognise marriages of any 
two eligible people, regardless of their sex or gender (Open Society Foundations, 2014, 
p. 5). Accordingly, it is submitted that all of the humiliation, frustration and trauma 
suffered by, for example, the applicants in the KOS v Minister of Home Affairs matter, 
could have been avoided had the South African government in 2006 rather opted for 
a single marriage statute, recognising both same-sex and opposite-sex marriage in one 
piece of legislation, instead of promulgating the “equal but different” Civil Union 
Act.85 It is submitted that genderism, heterosexism, homophobia and transphobia 
were probably the underlying reasons for the introduction of another act. In the words 
of Binns-Ward J, at para 69 of the KOS v Minister of Home Affairs (footnotes omitted): 
“[The inconsistent reasoning by the Director-General of Home Affairs] 
highlights, I think, the confusion that appears to exist in the minds of the 
respondents and officialdom in the Department concerning the import and effect 
of the relevant legislation. I regret to say that their approach appears to have 
been coloured by the persisting influence of the religious and social prejudice 
against the recognition of same-sex unions that, according to their evidence, was 
accommodated by the decision not to amend the Marriage Act but to bring in the 
Civil Union Act alongside it instead. They have not identified a single provision 
in any of the legislation to which they refer that expressly forbids the processing 
and positive determination of the transgender spouses’ applications under the 
Alteration Act. All that they have been able to point to are the socio-religious 
objections that reportedly influenced the legislature’s decision to introduce the 
Civil Union Act and leave the Marriage Act unamended. They do not explain 
why those considerations should, or properly could, weigh to distort the plain 
meaning of the enactments as they appear in the statute book.” 
 
An amendment to the South African Marriage Act, similar to the 2013 amendment to 
the New Zealand Marriage Act, defining marriage as “the union of 2 people, 
regardless of their sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity” (Parliamentary Counsel 
Office, 2013), would have prevented much anguish and discrimination.86  
 
85 This dual system of regulation has been the subject of much criticism, amongst others, by (De Vos & 
Barnard, 2007) and (de Ru, 2010). See also (Sloth-Nielsen, 2019, pp. 12-13) where she discusses the 
possible impact of the KOS matter upon a constitutional challenge to the existence of this system of 
regulation in terms of two pieces of legislation. She also explains in fn 44 that South Africa is not unique 
in this regard.  
86 See, however, Project 144 by the South African Law Reform Commission, Issue Paper 35, available at 
http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/ipapers/ip35_prj144_SingleMarriageStatute.pdf, (last accessed 20 July 
2020) calling for an investigation and public submissions in respect of proposals for “a single marriage 
Act that will enable South Africans of different religious and cultural persuasions to conclude legal 




Nevertheless, even in instances where marriage or “comparable institutions”87 
are not available to persons who changed their sex, it is submitted that the “point of 
entry” rule,88 as applied by the French Rennes Court of Appeal in October 2012, should 
be followed. In terms of this rule, the validity of a marriage is determined at the time 
it was concluded. Binns-Ward J never comprehensively discussed the argument in 
KOS v Minister of Home Affairs that the marriage between the applicants became 
void(able) because one of the material elements, namely two persons of the opposite 
sex, was subsequently found to have become lacking during the existence of the 
marriage. The Court found that, in South Africa, there is “no parallel system of civil 
marriage, … ; there is only a parallel system for the solemnisation of marriages”; 
because there is essentially no difference between marriages concluded in terms of the 
two pieces of legislation; and because there is no provision which provides for the 
conversion of a marriage in terms of the Marriage Act into a marriage in terms of the 
Civil Union Act, the marriages of the applicants were valid. In addition, it is submitted 
that the Court could also have added that the marriages remained valid due to the fact 
that, at the time of conclusion, they met the conditions of validity set by the legislation 
in force. If, by means of analogy, one of the spouses of a validly-entered-into-marriage, 
became mentally ill during the existence of the marriage  ̶  thus one of the material 
elements, namely capacity to act, was now found to be lacking  ̶ the marriage would 




The case law discussed in this article are examples of a number of instances where the 
State attempted to impose divorces on couples who wish to remain married. The 
crucial difference between the sets of circumstances is that in the South African matter, 
the requirement was not sanctioned by the legislature but developed by a state 
department, apparently due to a computer system that could not cope with the data 
it received. It would appear that in this instance, notwithstanding a piece of legislation 
 
marriages that will accord with the doctrine of equality as encapsulated in the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa”. 
87 See Hämäläinen v Finland, discussed above at 15. 
88 Also referred to as the Napier rule in English law, following the decision of Napier v Napier [1915] P. 
184, 189. See also (Dunne, 2018, pp. 221-222). 
89 See further, (Dunne, 2018, pp. 221-223), analysing both arguments for and against the “point of entry” 
rule. 
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enabling the change of a person’s sex without the condition of termination of 
marriage, a lack of artificial intelligence was blamed as being the transphobic culprit.90  
 
It is remarkable that in 2016, the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions of 
the UK could still hide behind the argument that the ECHR does not compel States to 
recognise same-sex marriages and the CJEU did not have the jurisdiction to decide 
over the matter in MB. It is astonishing to think that the Member States of the EU (or 
any other jurisdiction) still have the competency to make the recognition of a sex 
change dependent on the requirement that such a person is not allowed to remain 
married to their spouse whom they married prior to the change. This article has 
argued why it is incorrect to impose such a requirement.  
 
However, it has also shown that, even in the absence of such legislation, 
genderism and transphobia may still deny persons who had changed their sex their 
rights to equality and non-discrimination, privacy, dignity, freedom of association, the 
right to family life and the best interests of their children. It appears that, although 
South African legislation scores “top marks in a global report about fighting 
homophobia” the country fares poorly “on the ground”, leading to the conclusion that 
progressive legislation and court decisions do “not necessarily change a country’s 
mindset” (Farber, 2019). Although the CJEU may continue to find creative ways to 
circumvent legislation that impose divorce upon certain couples, and although 
discriminatory legislation may be amended by court decisions, transphobia and 
genderism will continue to infiltrate governmental departments for as long as there is 
a misperception or lack of understanding of the “otherness”. In the same way that so 
many other examples of fear of the unknown and judgement of individuals who do 
not conform to society’s expectations continue to cloud the level of appreciation and 
acceptance of some members of society, bias will remain the cause of the violation of 
many rights. However, the law must continue to withdraw its support for these 
normative ideas, to eradicate rules that treat people differently because of the way 
they look, dress or express themselves. In the words of the Advocate General in point 
104 of his Opinion to the MB matter, these cases concern  
“unique and singular [realities], which [fit] with difficulty into the traditionally 
binary divisions on which the prohibition of sex discrimination relies. The 
circumstances of the case must be placed in that perspective. It concerns a rather 
limited number of individuals facing profound challenges often in situations of 
 
90 Although it is acknowledged that “machine learning” and “AI decision-making” may also create risks 
of discrimination (Borgesius, 2018). 
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vulnerability. It has to do with a complex human reality with which individual 
legal orders have struggled to catch up over time”. 
 
It is the task of the law to allow for different perspectives and protect the vulnerable. 
It must continue to enable humans to recognise that it is only humans who have the 
ability to implement or deny other humans their rights. Computers fit into boxes, 
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